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This study investigates the impacts of regional informal institutions and local governance arrangements on the revenue
growth of both male- and female-run firms in Vietnam. Utilizing institutional theory and the literature on feminism, we
argue that male- and female-run firms are responsive to different sets of institutions. Analysing more than 1.1 million
observations in 11 years (2006–16), we find that female-run firms benefit from collective action norms and non-
finance-related governance forces, while male-run firms perform better under pro-entrepreneurship norms and
finance-related governance forces.
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INTRODUCTION
Institutions (rules and norms) are important to entrepre-
neurship, but especially affect female entrepreneurs (Acs
et al., 2011), whose businesses are relatively small and
hence vulnerable to local and regional environments (Wat-
son, 2002). However, the extant literature has paid little
interest to examining the effects of institutions on
female-run firms. Some prior work investigating the
topic stops short at matching formal institutions (rules of
laws) against the likelihood of women starting up in
business (Estrin & Mickiewicz, 2011). These analyses
have two salient drawbacks. First, they ignore the roles
of informal institutions (norms) and the institutions of
governance (the execution of the rules of laws at a local
level). These two dimensions of institutions, according
to Williamson (2000), significantly shape entrepreneurs’
incentives, behaviours and performance. Second, previous
studies simply identify which institutions are (not) ben-
eficial to female entrepreneurship with an assumption
that those forces that are conducive to male entrepreneur-
ship are, as a matter of course, not beneficial to female
entrepreneurship, and vice versa (Estrin & Mickiewicz,
2011; Powell & Eddleston, 2013).
This study addresses such gaps in the literature by (1)
focusing on the roles played by informal institutions and
local governance; and (2) examining how female and
male entrepreneurs respond to different dimensions of
informal institutions and local governance. We subscribe
to social feminist theory (Fischer et al., 1993) to suggest
that men and women are inherently different by nature.
Therefore, the self-perception and reaction to external
institutional environments are gendered (Orser et al.,
2010). Differential processes in responding to institutional
arrangements may explain gendered differences in entre-
preneurial performance.
We make use of the unique historical trajectory of
Vietnam to identify the existence of collective action
norms and pro-entrepreneurship norms. In the Vietna-
mese context, collective action norms come about through
a social structure in which the village was the foundational
administrative unit, with villagers working together to
provide public goods, communal services and property
registers (Dell et al., 2018). Pro-entrepreneurship norms,
on the other hand, are generated by a social structure in
which pro-Western authorities boost capitalist values
and governance systems, encouraging international
trading, private businesses and entrepreneurship (Nguyen
et al., 2018). These informal institutional forces emerged
from a long history and are embedded in the local tra-
ditions, values and customs that may exert distinct impacts
on local male and female entrepreneurship.
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We also assess a miscellany of local governance
arrangements to identify their dissimilar effects on the
growth performances of both male- and female-run
businesses. Specifically, we examine a set of governance
arrangements related to implicit money transactions
between entrepreneurs and the authorities (which we call
finance-related governance forces) and a set of governance
arrangements related to procedural regulations and the
perceptible supports and services offered by local auth-
orities (called non-finance-related governance). We
argue that female entrepreneurs and male entrepreneurs
may be responsive to different sets of governance forces.
Using a large and representative data set of more than
1.1 million observations of Vietnamese private firms
(mostly small and very small businesses) across 11 years
(2006–16), we find some evidence to support the hetero-
geneity of gendered entrepreneurship in relation to insti-
tutions. In particular, we find that female-run firms are
better off interacting with collective action norms and
non-finance-related governance forces, whereas male-run
firms benefit from pro-entrepreneurship norms and
finance-related governance forces.
This study makes three important contributions to the
regional entrepreneurship literature. It is one of the first
studies of female entrepreneurship that goes beyond the
conventional formal institutional modelling to examine
the importance of informal institutions and the insti-
tutions of governance. Second, it thoroughly investigates
the effects of institutions on both male and female entre-
preneurship to match gender-related issues to the appro-
priate institutional settings. Third, it proposes a
multilayer, multifaceted analytical model of institutions
that opens a novel research topic, extending our under-
standing of the linkages between institutions and gendered
entrepreneurship.
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Institutions and gendered entrepreneurship
Institutions shape the context in which entrepreneurs
operate, and therefore affect both the opportunities and
risks that they face. Williamson (2000) proposes a hierar-
chy framework in which he places informal institutions –
social embeddedness – at the most profound position in
the institutional structure. The reason for this is that
these unwritten institutional forces are the deepest rooted
and regionally sticky (Fritsch & Storey, 2014; Fritsch &
Wyrwich, 2014). Formal institutions are located at the
second level and are easier to modify relative to informal
institutions (Moodysson & Zukauskaite, 2014).
Williamson’s (2000) third level of institutions is gov-
ernance. At this level, more attention is paid to under-
standing how the game is played regionally rather than
deciphering the rules of the game (Charron et al., 2014).
In other words, the institutions of governance are con-
cerned with how the formal institutions are executed and
implemented at the local level (Nguyen et al., 2018).
This regional institutional dimension is particularly
important to entrepreneurship in developing countries.
The reason is that small businesses are typically bounded
in their local markets, which are strongly shaped by local
governance (Fritsch & Wyrwich, 2014; Nguyen, 2019).
Meanwhile, the formal institutional frameworks in devel-
oping countries are incomplete and underdeveloped; as
such, they may not be fully, consistently and efficiently
executed across a country’s regions, but are rather more
likely to depend on the interpretation and enforcement
efficiency of local government (Du & Mickiewicz, 2016;
Zhou, 2013). Unfortunately, regional institutions of gov-
ernance remain largely underexplored in the extant litera-
ture. As such, in this study, we take a step further to
propose that within a country (i.e., formal institutions
are held constant) male and female entrepreneurs respond
differently to local informal institutions and regional insti-
tutions of governance. Figure 1 summarizes the analytical
framework of our study.
Collective action norms and
pro-entrepreneurship norms
In the context of this study, informal institutions are cap-
tured by a set of historical events specific to Vietnam. In
particular, we examine the importance of collective action
norms and pro-entrepreneurial norms using the country’s
unique historical trajectory over the past 150 years.
Dell et al. (2018) argue that the states in Northeast
Asia were heavily influenced by Chinese statecraft (Sinic
Figure 1. Analytical framework.
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states), while the states in Southeast Asia were largely
impacted by Hindu–Buddhist statecraft imported from
India (Indic states). The key difference between the two
lays in the degrees of their collective action norms (Taylor,
1998). Specifically, Sinic states had well-developed tax sys-
tems, bureaucracies and legal codes. The village was the
foundational administrative unit and villagers had to
work together to provide public goods, maintain property
registers and pay their village-level taxes to the central
states (Cooke, 1994). As such, Sinic states are character-
ized by strong communal values, which were institutiona-
lized and gradually became the bedrock of the collective
action norms of doing business in these states (Dell
et al., 2018).
In contrast, Indic states followed a more decentralized
patron–client model. Peasants paid tribute to landowning
patrons and received protections; patrons, in turn, had
their own personalized relations with higher level patrons
(Acharya, 2013). Powers were not clearly defined among
the administrative layers and the village was not the central
unit of administrative organization. Therefore, compared
with Sinic states, the norms of doing business in Indic
states were more individualistic rather than collective
(Banerjee & Iyer, 2005).
Modern Vietnam is, interestingly, a combination of
these two societies. Originally established from the North-
east state of Daiviet, which was governed by China for
more than 1000 years, in 938, Daiviet gained indepen-
dence from China and expanded its territories to the
southern parts of modern Vietnam, retaining all its Chi-
nese statecraft characteristics, including the collective
action norms (Lei & Chen, 2011). This remained the situ-
ation until 1883 when it was colonized by the French. The
southern region, however, was historically embedded in
Indic (Khmer/Cambodia) institutions (Chandler, 1983).
Moreover, the southernmost section of Vietnam was
only organized into Daiviet administrative villages in
1698, a mere 150 years before the French colonization
(Dell et al., 2018). Therefore, Daiviet institutions had lit-
tle time to erase and replace the Indic institutions that
were embedded in the south.
During the Second World War, Vietnam was divided
into two states that followed distinct institutional settings.
Under the 1954 Geneva Accords, Vietnam was demar-
cated at the 17th Parallel into two states. North Vietnam
followed the socialist blueprint from the outset, whereas
South Vietnam was exposed to capitalism during the
period 1954–75. During the period of partition, the
authorities in North Vietnam spread socialist values and
planned the economy by, inter alia, nationalizing
enterprises, making illegal private properties/private
businesses and discriminating against entrepreneurship.
At the same time, in South Vietnam, pro-Western auth-
orities were boosting capitalist values and governance sys-
tems, encouraging international trades, private businesses
and entrepreneurship (Nguyen et al., 2018). The pro-
entrepreneurship norms of doing business that originated
from South Vietnam’s exposure to capitalism were
retained after the two states reunified, in which respect,
Vietnam is similar to East and West Germany (Fritsch
& Storey, 2014).
Collective action norms and female-run firms
In this study, we argue that female entrepreneurs are more
responsive to collective action norms. This expectation is
built on the social capital, shared knowledge, and psycho-
logical benefits that female entrepreneurs obtain from col-
lective action norms.
Social networking, defined as ‘the quantity and quality
of an individual’s social connections’ (Heikkila et al., 2016,
p. 1274), sometimes understood as a community-level
construct, is a gendered process (Hanson & Blake,
2009).1 Also, women exposed to local collective action
norms possess higher levels of social capital than women
who are not in collective action norms since this type of
norms helps facilitate the functioning of quasi-family
communities. The social connections embedded in this
type of norms provide female entrepreneurs with
additional resources that are useful to the entrepreneurial
process. For example, Powell and Eddleston (2013) exam-
ine a sample of 253 US entrepreneurs and reveal that
females obtain more human, social and financial capital
when they have strong linkages with families and local
communities. Therefore, it is expected that collective
action norms characterized by close social connections
with local communities provide female entrepreneurs
with more resources for expanding their businesses.
Shared knowledge is another mechanism that explains
the positive association between collective action norms
and female entrepreneurship. We follow Durbin (2011)
to posit that knowledge can be created through network-
ing; and women may interact and mingle in some specific
ways that men do not (Ibarra, 1993). For example, Ibarra
(1992) examines the networking patterns of 34 men and
45 women in a US company and concludes that while
men are more likely to form homophilous ties (with
other men), women evidence a differentiated network pat-
tern in which they obtained social support from all acces-
sible sources. These empirical evidence points to an
expectation that female entrepreneurs, in the presence of
active collective action norms, are able to extract knowl-
edge and support from their local communities, and
hence boosts their business performance.
Besides external resources, female entrepreneurs may
also build higher levels of psychological confidence
when supported by active collective action norms. For
example, DeMartino and Barbato (2003), in a sample
of 2840 US MBA entrepreneurs, document that two-
thirds of female entrepreneurs in their sample structure
their businesses around their personal life, whereas only
15% of male entrepreneurs do so. In this situation, local
communities operating under active collective action
norms may provide female entrepreneurs with family-
like support and encouragement, helping them to balance
domestic and professional tasks (Powell & Eddleston,
2013). These constructive social arrangements help
increase female entrepreneurs’ psychological confidence
in pursuing their entrepreneurship career pathway,
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thereby boosting their intentions to grow, with conse-
quent positive impacts on their business development
(Eddleston & Powell, 2008).
In general, in the light of the previous empirical find-
ings, we propose that social capital, shared knowledge and
psychological confidence that female entrepreneurs extract
from collective action norms may help them obtain more
support and resources to improve their business growth.
As such, we propose:
Hypothesis H1: In Vietnam, local collective action norms are
positively associated with female-run businesses’ revenue
growth.
Pro-entrepreneurship norms and male
entrepreneurship
In contrast to collective action norms, we propose that
pro-entrepreneurship norms are conducive to male-run
businesses. Pro-entrepreneurship norms in the context
of Vietnam originate from capitalism, which convention-
ally regards entrepreneurship as a masculine career path-
way (Nguyen et al., 2018). Empirically, Gupta et al.
(2009), in the contexts of Turkey, the United States
and India, show that even with the increase of female
entrepreneurs recently, people still believe that entrepre-
neurship is a masculine career. In the context of Viet-
nam, Watson et al. (2014) evidently show that male
entrepreneurs gain more access to resources associated
with government pro-entrepreneurship policies; mean-
while, female entrepreneurs are still constrained due to
societal prejudices.
Also, it has been shown that men, in general, demon-
strate lower levels of risk aversion and a greater tendency to
overconfidence (Benartzi & Thaler, 1995). These mascu-
line characteristics apparently fit well into the environment
typified by pro-entrepreneurship norms. Moreover, male
entrepreneurial style is stereotypically performance driven,
independent and competition based (Powell & Eddleston,
2013). These characteristics are translated into larger firm
size, higher revenues, profits and exports in several empiri-
cal contexts characterized by active pro-entrepreneurship
norms.
Further, male entrepreneurs do not face gender-related
personal problems that are experienced by female entre-
preneurs. For example, Setiawati and Kartini (2018), in
a study of 180 West Java female entrepreneurs, show
that their dominant entrepreneurial motivation is family
oriented, consisting of having more time with their family
and for housework. With the presence of pro-entrepre-
neurship norms, women are also more inclined to pursue
an entrepreneurship career. They are nevertheless expected
to maintain their social role as housewives taking care of
domestic tasks (Du Rietz & Henrekson, 2000). As such,
they are inevitably left behind male entrepreneurs, whose
venturing activities are fully endorsed by the pro-entrepre-
neurship norms.
In sum, we argue that pro-entrepreneurship norms are
more beneficial to male than female entrepreneurs in terms
of social supports and access to productive resources (e.g.,
time). As such, we have:
Hypothesis H2: In Vietnam, local pro-entrepreneurship norms
are positively associated with male-run businesses’ revenue
growth.
Non-finance-related governance and female
entrepreneurship
Local governance indicates the public services and quality
of local government that substantially reshape local entre-
preneurs’ incentives and behaviours (Nguyen & Canh,
2020). In this study, we examine a miscellany of govern-
ance forces, which we separate into two dimensions:
finance-related governance forces (e.g., corruption) and
non-finance-related governance forces (e.g., business reg-
ister regulations). We argue that female-run businesses are
more responsive to non-finance-related governance qual-
ity. Meanwhile, male-run businesses are more responsive
to finance-related governance quality.
Non-finance-related governance forces, in this study,
denote the procedural regulations and perceptible supports
and services offered by local authorities to the entrepre-
neurial sector. These governance arrangements could be
the entry costs for new firms (the number of procedures
and length of business registration in days), or business
supports (provincial services for trade promotion, business
partner matchmaking, the provision of industrial zones or
clusters and technological services).2
These services and supports are beneficial for female-
run businesses because their firms are relatively small and
resource constrained; also, female entrepreneurs are typi-
cally restricted in their access to the economic resources
needed for entrepreneurship, including financial capital.
This inferiority associated with female-run firms has
been confirmed across the world, including China
(Wang et al., 2019), Vietnam and Singapore (Gerrard
et al., 2003). As such, a strong and inclusive set of pro-
cedural regulations and perceptible supports and services
could have significant impacts on female-run firms.
Also, since men’s and women’s political attitudes
diverge, they may play the institutional game differently.
Specifically, women are less interested in political issues
and less active in participating in addressing governance
problems than men (see Diekman & Schneider, 2010,
for a theoretical discussion). This is particularly the case
in Southeast Asian countries with Eastern cultural values.
For example, Gerrard et al. (2003), in a study of 75 Viet-
namese female entrepreneurs, show that they have intense
Confucian mindsets, leading to ignorant attitudes
towards political issues. Similarly, Wang et al. (2019),
using a multiregional sample of 206 Chinese entrepre-
neurs, demonstrate that Chinese women entrepreneurs
have more negative perceptions of the regulative insti-
tutional environment than their male counterparts due
to their limited political ties and lower legitimacy in
economic activities in the country. As such, they conclude
that improved foundational procedural regulations and
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perceptible supports and services are essential to female
start-ups.
In light of the previous findings, it is expected that a set
of well-structured regulations with comprehensive public
services and supports helps female entrepreneurs obtain
resources and improve the performance of their businesses.
Therefore, we have:
Hypothesis H3: In Vietnam, improvements in local non-
finance-related governance forces are positively associated with
female-run businesses’ revenue growth.
Finance-related governance and male
entrepreneurship
Whereas non-finance-related governance concerns the
official regulations published by local governments,
finance-related governance forces incorporate the govern-
ance arrangements related to implicit money transactions
between entrepreneurs and authorities (such as bribery).
These governance forces are concerned with informal
policies and the quality of government and include factors
such as administration transparency and corruption (Mal-
esky et al., 2015). As such, finance-related governance is
related to the process through which officials deliver pub-
lic services and has to do with their rent-seeking
behaviours.
From the theoretical viewpoints, whether these gov-
ernance forces exert stronger or weaker effects on male-
run firms relative to female-run firms remain an open
question. On the one hand, male-run firms could reap
more benefits than female-run firms from weak finance-
related governance (e.g., corruption). The reason is that
male entrepreneurs are more likely than females to engage
in political issues and participate in wider political net-
works. Estrin and Mickiewicz (2011), in a study of 55
countries, show that informal social networks for resource
acquisition tend to be male dominated. This may enhance
the chances that they successfully grab public contracts,
leading to higher revenues performance. Moreover, also
thanks to their being involved in political networks to a
greater extent, they could exploit the weaknesses of local
governance (e.g., corruption) to seek economic rents. Evi-
dently, De Jong et al. (2012), in the context of Vietnam,
show that bribery allows entrepreneurs to develop and fos-
ter a network of informal relationships with public offi-
cials, and reap the accompanying benefits. However,
they also find that bribery is associated with several disad-
vantages; and suggest a hill-shaped non-monotonic
relationship between bribery and revenues. This line of
arguments leads to an expectation that improvements in
finance-related governance are negatively associated with
male-run firms’ revenue growth.
However, another line of arguments suggests that
male-run firms benefit more from improvements of
finance-related governance, for the following reasons.
First, once again, since male entrepreneurs are more likely
than females to engage in political issues and participate in
wider political networks, it may put them firmly on the
radar of corrupt officials. Meanwhile, male-run firms are
typically more active than female-run firms in economic
activities such as making high-value and long-term invest-
ment projects (e.g., research and development – R&D)
(Strohmeyer et al., 2017), and expanding businesses to
non-traditional industries (e.g., cleantech) (Anna et al.,
2000). This puts their owners into situations that rely
heavily on customized public services and requires them
to build up strong back-door relationships with their
local authorities. As such, male entrepreneurs are expected
to be more responsive, in a positive way, to finance-related
governance (e.g., bribery) in comparison with their female
colleagues.
Meanwhile, there is strong evidence that females
uphold a higher ethical standard, are less selfish and are
simply less willing to engage in bribery actions. For
example, Johnson et al. (2018) show in their experimental
studies that it is because of these upright characteristics,
women are more likely to obtain crowdfunding. In
addition, Lan and Hong (2017), also using experimental
methods, demonstrate that males give larger bribes in pri-
vate contexts than in public, whereas females give smaller
bribes in both contexts. At the same time, male entrepre-
neurs are more focused on winning and outperforming
others (performance driven) than females (Lan & Hong,
2017). As such, to achieve this end, male entrepreneurs
would be conceivably more likely to both bribe and pay
higher bribe values than females.
Following this line of arguments, male entrepreneurs
need to expend more resources (finance, capital and
time) to play the bribery game, and these unproductive
activities may distract them from entrepreneurial tasks,
thereby harming their ventures’ performance. As such,
we expect male entrepreneurs to be more responsive, in a
positive way, to improvements in local finance-related
governance forces than females.
Given that there are two contrasted expectations fol-
lowing the two strands of the literature, ultimately, the
relative impacts of finance-related governance on male-
and female-run firms is an empirical question. Even
though we state hypothesis H4 following the literature
arguing for the positive impacts of improvements of
finance-related governance on male-run firms, we remain
open to the possibility that improvements of finance-
related governance are negatively associated with male-
run firms. Therefore, we have:
Hypothesis H4: In Vietnam, improvements in local finance-
related governance forces are positively associated with male-
run businesses’ revenue growth.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Data
The empirical context of this study is Vietnam, where dis-
crimination against females is still rife (Coxhead et al.,
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2019), and the country thus fits well into the theoretical
settings of this study. To test the proposed hypotheses,
we employ the Annual Enterprise Survey data set pro-
vided by the Vietnam General Statistics Office (GSO).
The survey was first conducted in 2000, and the data
set has been updated annually. The data set provides
comprehensive information about firms’ financial charac-
teristics, employment, investment and performance. The
scope of the survey comprises both manufacturing and
service industries and includes all types of ownership.
The panel data obtained from GSO is 17 years, from
2000 to 2016. It is by far the most comprehensive and
representative data set of the business community in
Vietnam.3
The period of analysis in this study is scaled down to 11
years, from 2006 to 2016, to match with the second data
set, the Provincial Competitiveness Index (PCI), a joint
product of the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce (VCCI)
and the US Agency for International Development
(USAID). This data set is a panel of provincial governance
quality. The quality is scored from 0 to 100: the higher the
score, the better the governance quality. The PCI is calcu-
lated based on a survey of more than 17,000 domestic firms
and 1700 foreign firms across provinces in Vietnam. In
2006, it became available for all provinces and has been
updated annually.
We combine the firm-level GSO data set with the
provincial level PCI data set to create a multilevel
panel of 11 years. Our population of interest in this
study is private businesses. The data set is unbalanced
and requires cleaning before use. As such, we drop all
observations that have meaningless accounting reports.
We control the outliers by censoring the top and bottom
1% of observations in each variable. The final sample in
our study thus includes 1,115,577 observations of dom-
estic private businesses. The number of firms per year
varies from 22,387 in 2006 to 218,601 in 2016, in
which the number of micro-firms (firms that have
fewer than 10 employees), which accounts for 56.8% of
the total sample on average, varies from 17,582 in
2006 to 109,555 in 2016.4
Variables and summary statistics
The dependent variable of interest in this study is firm
performance measured by revenue growth, which is the
percentage change in revenues between two consecutive
years. We use firm growth instead of annual revenue
values to reduce the effects of unobserved firm-specific
characteristics on firm performance (Nguyen et al.,
2018).
The independent variables are a set of informal insti-
tutions and local governance. We measure collective
actions norms (north of Vietnam) and pro-entrepreneur-
ship norms (south of Vietnam) using three dummy vari-
ables: North, which takes a value of 1 if a firm is located
to the north of Vietnam (above the 17th Parallel), and 0
otherwise; Daiviet, which takes a value of 1 if a firm is
located in the former Daiviet territories identified before
1698, and 0 otherwise; and Daiviet Pure, which takes a
value of 1 if a firm is located in the former Daiviet ter-
ritories, excluding firms in Hanoi (the capital and
second-largest business hub), and 0 otherwise, excluding
firms in Hochiminh (the largest business hub). This
third variable is intended to eliminate the effects caused
by recent interactions between modern cities, which may
weaken the effects of the informal institutions. The
number of observations in Daiviet Pure (after excluding
the two largest cities) is 401,640, which is 36% of the
total sampled observations. It is noteworthy that value
1 in all three variables indicates the existence of collec-
tive action norms, while 0 specifies pro-entrepreneurship
norms.
We construct local governance variables using a set of
nine PCI sub-indices. Using the principal factor analysis
technique to analyse the correlation among the indices,
we observe that the eigenvalues suggest the existence of
two factors.5 Three indices (land access, transparency
and corruption) load on factor 1 (alpha ¼ 0.81) while
the other six (time costs, leadership proactivity, business
supports, labour training, entry costs and legal institutions)
load on factor 2 (alpha ¼ 0.72).
Land, in the context of Vietnam, is regulated as a
common property owned by the government and admi-
nistered by local authorities. Land access, the security of
tenure and the ease with which operation permits are
granted depend largely on the arbitrary decisions of gov-
ernment officials (Makino & Tsang, 2011). As such,
together with corruption and transparency, land access
is one of the most crucial governance arrangements
that attract bribery activities (Malesky et al., 2015).
Therefore, we name this factor finance-related governance.
The other six indices are more to do with procedural
regulations and the perceptible supports and services
offered by local authorities and are therefore named
non-finance-related governance.6
Following the extant literature, we include a set of
covariates that may influence firm growth. At the firm
level, we control for firm size, firm age, investment
and industry. These variables represent firm- and indus-
try-specific characteristics that significantly determine
firm performance. At the entrepreneur level, we control
for owner age and education. These individual-specific
factors play an essential role in determining firm per-
formance because they indicate the knowledge and
experience associated with the entrepreneurs, which
may markedly influence their ability to recognize and
evaluate business opportunities (Nguyen, 2018). At the
provincial level, we include three variables: provincial
consumption per capita and local population density,
which control for local market demands; and working
population, which controls for local human resource
supply. The definition and summary statistics of these
variables are presented in Table 1. The pairwise corre-




In general, the summary statistics indicate that the
average annual revenue growth rate is approximately
10.5%. Interestingly, female-run firms do not necessarily
achieve a lower growth rate compared with male-run
firms. Furthermore, there are more female-owned firms
in regions endowed with collective action norms, while
there are more male-owned firms in regions endowed
with pro-entrepreneurship norms.













Revenue growth Percentage of net revenue growth over two consecutive years 0.142 0.148 0.139
North Takes a value of 1 for firms located to the north of the 17th
Parallel, 0 otherwise. Column (4) reports the percentage of
female-run firms in the north (in comparison with total female-
run firms in both north and south); and column (5) reports the
percentage of male-run firms in the north (in comparison with
total male-run firms in both north and south)
0.609 0.643 0.581
Daiviet Takes a value of 1 for firms located in the original Daiviet
territories, 0 otherwise. Column (4) reports the percentage of
female-run firms in Daiviet (in comparison with total female-run
firms in both Daiviet and non-Daiviet), and column (5) reports
the percentage of male-run firms in Daiviet (in comparison with
total male-run firms in both Daiviet and non-Daiviet)
0.575 0.606 0.541
Daiviet Pure Takes a value of 1 for firms located in the original Daiviet
territories (save for firms in Hanoi), 0 otherwise (save for firms in
Hochiminh). Column (4) reports the percentage of female-run
firms in Daiviet Pure (in comparison with total female-run firms
in both Daiviet Pure and non-Daiviet Pure); and column (5)
reports the percentage of male-run firms in Daiviet Pure (in










Average of six PCI sub-indices: time costs; proactivity; business
supports; labour training; entry cost; and legal institutions
5.924 5.959 5.929
Owner age Age of entrepreneurs (years) 42.312 41.725 42.675
Owner education Takes a value of 1 for no degrees, 2 junior technical degrees, 3
senior technical degrees, 4 professional vocational degrees, 5
college degrees, 6 bachelors, 7 for masters and 8 for doctoral
level
5.634 5.440 5.407
Firm size Natural logarithm of the number of employees (reported here as
the number of employees)
16.250 15.693 25.895
Firm age Years since establishment of the firm 6.123 6.240 6.502
Investment Ratio of firm investment values to total capital 0.379 0.361 0.385
Provincial
consumption
Provincial consumption value per capita (million VND) 26.917 27.789 25.586
Population density Provincial population density (persons/km2) 2313 2370 2201
Labour supply Working population in a province (thousand persons) 3035 3081 2922
% 100% 27.723% 72.277%
Note: Number of observations is 1,115,577 firm-years in Vietnam in the period 2006–16. All values are deflated to 2010 prices using the official gross
domestic product (GDP) deflator.
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Specification and estimation
Based on the conventional revenue growth model, we pro-









where i denotes an individual firm; g is the province; and t is
a year. Therefore, Revenuegrowthigt is the revenue
growth rate that firm i in province g achieves in year t.
The term Firmcontrolsigt comprises the variables firm age,
labour size and investments; Owner controlsigt includes
owner age and education variables;Province controlsgt
has provincial consumption per capita, population
density and labour supply; Collectiveactionnormsgt is a
vector of three dummy variables: North, Daiviet and
Daiviet Pure, which represent the existence of collective
action norms. Finally, Finance-related governancegt and
Non-finance-related governancegt represent the two distinct
dimensions of local governance.
In addition, the equation includes an industry-specific
component vj , a time-specific component vt and time-
invariant provincial characteristics vg , which are con-
trolled by their corresponding dummies. Also, we cluster
standard errors to the provincial level. The term vi
represents all the time-invariant, firm-specific factors
that may influence firm performance. Finally, mit is the
idiosyncratic error.
Since there are two sets of institutional forces under
investigation, that is, regional informal institutions and
provincial governance quality, we employ two estimation
strategies correspondingly. First, to estimate the impacts
of collective action norms and pro-entrepreneurship
norms on firm revenues, we employ a fixed-effects (FE)
technique. FE is feasible in our case because there are sev-
eral firms moving across north–south regions in the study
window. Specifically, there are 7635 firms moving across
the regions, in which 4198 firms moved from the north
to the south of Vietnam and 3473 moved in the opposite
direction. Details of the numbers of moving firms by year
are presented in Appendix E in the supplemental data
online. Also, it is noteworthy that informal institutions
are sticky and stable over time (Fritsch & Mueller,
2007). Therefore, we do not expect endogeneity-related
issues stemming from the reverse effects of firm perform-
ance to informal institutions. Given these features of the
specification, we propose FE as an appropriate estimator.
However, in our study period, firms moved across regions
either come to Hanoi or Hochiminh only. As such, for the
variable Daiviet Pure – where firms in the two cities are
excluded, FE technique becomes invalid. We thus employ
random effects (RE) for this particular specification.
In terms of local governance, prior studies indicate that
firm growth imposes impacts on local governance quality,
which would cause a reverse effect (Tran, 2019). There-
fore, following Nguyen et al. (2018), we employ four vari-
ables as the instruments for local governance quality. The
first instrumental variable (IV) is the period a provincial
leader holds office. The longer the holding time, the
more likely that local governance quality gets either better
or worse, depending on the leader’s governance. There-
fore, we hold a neutral expectation about the correlation
of this IV and the quality of local governance. The second
IV is ‘leader switch’ – a dummy that takes a value of 1 if
there is a change of provincial top governor in a year,
and 0 otherwise. A change in provincial leaders indicates
a new governance system and style. Once again, this
change could be associated with governance quality
improvements or deteriorations. The last two IVs are the
‘third year’ and ‘fifth year’ dummies, which take value of
1 if a leader is in the third/fifth year of her tenure, and 0
otherwise. According to the data, leaders are most likely
to be changed every three years. Also, the fifth year is
important because it is the last year in the five-year tenure
period regulated by the central government. These two
time points are related to local governance quality because
leaders are more likely to engage in opportunistic beha-
viours approaching the termination of their appointments,
which lead to impaired governance quality. In general,
these variables are highly correlated with local governance
quality; However, they have little influence on firm growth
(see Nguyen et al., 2018, for more details).
Finally, to reduce concerns with endogeneity caused by
reverse effects from the control variables, we use one-year




The regression results are presented in Tables 2 and 3. The
variance inflation factor (VIF) tests suggest there is no sig-
nificant multicollinearity in our specifications. In Table 2,
the coefficients associated with the North and Daiviet Pure
variables in columns (1) and (5) are positive and statistically
significant. These findings indicate that collective action
norms embedded in Daiviet informal institutions (north of
Vietnam) provide support for women and help improve
the performance of their business ventures.7 Since the coef-
ficient associated with Daiviet in column (3) is not statisti-
cally significant, hypothesis H1 is supported to some extent.8
Meanwhile, the coefficients associated with the North
and Daiviet variables in columns (2) and (4) are negative
and statistically significant, indicating that male-run
firms in the south of Vietnam achieve better growth
rates than those in the north. These findings thus imply
that pro-entrepreneurship norms established from the
period when the region was exposed to capitalism help
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male entrepreneurs obtain some competitive advantages.9
However, the coefficient associated with Daiviet Pure in
column (6) is not statistically significant; as such, hypoth-
esis H2 is supported to some extent.
In terms of the economic size of the coefficients, the
regression results show that female-run firms located in
the north of Vietnam, on average, achieve annual revenues
that are 1.97% higher than female-run firms located in the
south of Vietnam (column 1, Table 2), ceteris paribus. This
gap is, according to the institutional theory, due to the
benefits that female entrepreneurs extract from collective
action norms embedded in informal institutions in the
north. Meanwhile, male-run firms located in the south
of Vietnam, on average, achieve annual revenues that are
1.63% higher than male-run firms located in the north
of Vietnam (column 2, Table 2), ceteris paribus. This bit
of advancement is attributed to the match between male
entrepreneurs’ management styles and the pro-entrepre-
neurship norms in the south.
Table 3 reports the results of local governance. The
coefficients associated with finance-related governance in
columns (1) and (2) are positive and significant. However,
the economic size of the coefficient in the male specifica-
tion is more than three times greater than the coefficient in
the female specification. Even though these coefficients
are not directly comparable since they are obtained from
two different subsamples, this finding provides some
initial evidence that male-run firms are more sensitive to
finance-related governance forces than female-run firms.
Turning to the non-finance-related governance variable,
its coefficients in columns (3) and (4) are positive, but
only statistically significant in column (3). The two coeffi-
cients are, once again, incomparable. However, they could
give us some initial evidence that female entrepreneurs are
responsive to non-finance-related governance forces, while
male entrepreneurs are not.
To compare the relative importance of the two govern-
ance forces, we run two lump-sum specifications for both
Table 2. Regression results – informal institutions.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)





Daiviet Pure 0.745** 0.132
(0.327) (0.205)
Owner age −0.069 0.021 −0.009 0.036 −0.003* −0.004***
(0.076) (0.053) (0.091) (0.070) (0.002) (0.001)
Owner education −0.028*** −0.046*** −0.018** −0.035*** −0.019*** −0.018***
(0.007) (0.005) (0.009) (0.006) (0.007) (0.004)
Firm size −0.494*** −0.459*** −0.482*** −0.464*** 0.011 −0.010
(0.031) (0.018) (0.034) (0.019) (0.017) (0.009)
Firm age 0.084 −0.202** −0.131 −0.256*** −0.010*** −0.007***
(0.089) (0.079) (0.124) (0.092) (0.002) (0.001)
Investment 0.417*** 0.440*** 0.449*** 0.450*** 0.224*** 0.205***
(0.040) (0.026) (0.046) (0.030) (0.038) (0.021)
Provincial consumption 0.011*** 0.008*** 0.023*** 0.016*** 0.001 0.000
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Population density −0.715 −1.016*** 3.234 1.262 0.081 0.089**
(0.528) (0.319) (1.982) (0.885) (0.071) (0.038)
Labour supply −0.807** 0.069 −3.360*** −1.726*** 0.075 0.052
(0.374) (0.207) (1.020) (0.484) (0.095) (0.048)
VIF 5.551 5.512 5.429 5.224 5.315 5.550
Observations 309,276 806,301 309,276 806,301 92,377 309,263
R2 0.156 0.133 0.166 0.143 0.122 0.134
Wald Chi2 p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: The estimator is fixed effects (FE) in specifications (1) to (4) and random effects (RE) in specifications (5) and (6) because there are no firms moving
across north–south regions when observations in Hanoi and Hochiminh are excluded. All estimations include full sets of two-digit industry dummies, 11-
year dummies and 63 provincial dummies. Standard errors and test statistics are clustered to the provincial level and are asymptotically robust to hetero-
skedasticity. Variance inflation factor (VIF) is a test of multicollinearity.
*Significant at 10%, **significant at 5% and ***significant at 1%.
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males and females in columns (5) and (6). The coefficients
associated with both variables now become statistically sig-
nificant in both specifications. As such, we conduct a two-
tailed t-test of the equality of the coefficients associate
with the two variables in each specification. The t-test
results indicate that the coefficients are not equal (the
difference between the two governance variables is signifi-
cant at 5% level). Specifically, in column (5) – female-run
firms – the result shows that the effect of non-finance-
related governance forces is statistically significantly larger
than the effect of finance-related governance forces. This
finding indicates that female entrepreneurs are more
responsive to non-finance-related governance than to
finance-related governance. As such, hypothesis H3 is
supported.
Meanwhile, in column 6 – male-run firms – the result
shows that the effect of finance-related governance forces
is statistically significantly larger than the effect of non-
finance-related governance forces. This finding indicates
that male entrepreneurs are more responsive to finance-
related governance than to non-finance-related govern-
ance. As such, hypothesis H4 is supported. This finding
thus echoes the strand of literature arguing for the burden
associated with the intensive engagement in political issues
and participation in wider political networks of male
entrepreneurs. We do not find evidence to support the
arguments that male entrepreneurs, thanks to their being
involved in political networks to a greater extent, could
exploit the weaknesses of local governance (e.g., corrup-
tion) to seek economic rents.
In terms of the economic size of the coefficients, the
regression results (column 5, Table 3) show that female-
run firms are twice more responsive to non-finance-related
governance (0.99) than to finance-related governance
(0.40). This is due to the smallness and disadvantages
associated with female-run firms, making them more reli-
ant on procedural regulations and perceptible supports and
services offered by local authorities. Meanwhile, the
regression results (column 6, Table 3) show that male-
run firms are five times more responsive to finance-related
Table 3. Regression results – local governance.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female Male Female Male Female Male
Finance-related governance β1 0.074*** 0.251*** 0.404*** 1.148***
(0.013) (0.021) (0.112) (0.046)
Non-finance-related governance β2 0.309*** 0.036 0.987*** 0.213***
(0.078) (0.062) (0.157) (0.027)
Owner age −0.004*** −0.004*** −0.005*** −0.006*** −0.004*** −0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Owner education −0.083*** −0.085*** −0.073*** −0.087*** −0.068*** −0.043***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003)
Firm size −0.035*** −0.045*** −0.035*** −0.003 −0.020** −0.014***
(0.008) (0.006) (0.013) (0.007) (0.008) (0.004)
Firm age −0.028*** −0.011*** −0.032*** −0.018*** −0.024*** −0.012***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Investment 0.329*** 0.363*** 0.304*** 0.411*** 0.312*** 0.377***
(0.018) (0.012) (0.029) (0.019) (0.018) (0.011)
Provincial consumption 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.018*** 0.013*** 0.004*** 0.004***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Population density −0.246*** −0.315*** −1.113*** −0.892*** −0.352*** −0.491***
(0.026) (0.020) (0.057) (0.029) (0.037) (0.020)
Labour supply −0.311*** −0.214*** −0.706*** −0.494*** 0.118*** 0.195***
(0.022) (0.013) (0.048) (0.025) (0.035) (0.022)
VIF 5.512 5.698 5.312 5.562 5.624 5.001
Observations 309,276 806,301 309,276 806,301 309,276 806,301
Hansen J p-value 0.062 0.068 0.051 0.043 0.054 0.041
SW F-test p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2 0.037 0.026 0.075 0.065 0.086 0.088
t-test β1 ¼ β2 p-value 0.024 0.000
Notes: The estimator is the instrumental variables (IV) technique. Hansen (J ) is the over-identification test. Sanderson–Windmeijer (SW) is the tests of weak
identification. All estimations include full sets of two-digit industry dummies, 11-year dummies and 63 provincial dummies. Standard errors and test stat-
istics are clustered to provincial level and are asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. Variance inflation factor (VIF) is a test of multicollinearity.
*Significant at 10%, **significant at 5% and ***significant at 1%.
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governance (1.15) than to non-finance-related governance
(0.21). This gap could be attributed to the nature of male-
run firms. They are typically larger and more profitable
than female-run firms. As such, they do not need much
of local perceptible supports and services. However, since
they face corruption to a greater extent, they are more
likely to be responsive to local finance-related governance.
Robustness tests
We also conduct a set of robustness tests as follows: (1)
exploring the effects of the nine PCI sub-indices; (2)
investigating the new venture subsample; and (3) examin-
ing the effects by industries. The results obtained from
these exercises are consistent with our key arguments
and are reported in Appendix C in the supplemental
data online.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
This study investigates the importance of informal insti-
tutions and the institutions of governance on male- and
female-run businesses. Specifically, it aims to answer the
question of whether male and female entrepreneurs are
responsive to different sets of institutions. Testing our
hypotheses in the context of Vietnam using a large and
representative data set of more than 1.1 million firm-
year observations in 11 years (2006–16), we find some
initial evidence that supports the heterogeneity of gen-
dered entrepreneurship in relation to institutions.
This study makes three important contributions to
regional entrepreneurship literature. First, it is one of the
first studies on female entrepreneurship that goes beyond
the conventional institutional modelling that focuses solely
on national institutions. The theoretical framework in this
study allows regional informal institutions and local gov-
ernance institutions to play a role in determining entrepre-
neurial performance. Prior work has paid substantial
research attention to national-level formal institutions,
such as government spending and the rules of law (Acs
et al., 2011; Estrin & Mickiewicz, 2011). Standing in
sharp contrast to this body of literature, we argue that
female-run businesses, due to their smallness and feminine
characteristics, may be more sensitive to the contextual
norms of doing business and the local governance arrange-
ments than to the very broad national constitutional
frameworks.
Second, this study is one of the first that thoroughly
investigates the effects of different sets of institutions on
both male and female entrepreneurship. Gender issues in
the entrepreneurship literature have been conventionally
investigated under the implicit assumption that the insti-
tutional settings that work for males will not work for
females, and vice versa. In this study, we do not simply
identify the institutions that are (not) beneficial to female
entrepreneurship but aim to match entrepreneurs’ gender
to the appropriate institutional settings. Our finding that
entrepreneurship is a gendered process, not only in terms
of management style but also in the way that entrepreneurs
respond to external stimuli and environments, opens a
novel research direction that highlights the importance
of gendered responses to different institutional forms.
Third, this study suggests a multifaceted model of
institutions. Previous studies usually employ a lump-
sum model to examine the impact of general formal
institutions on entrepreneurship. In this study, we
suggest that for each level of institutions, there are dis-
parate dimensions that are worth being examined
separately.
This study is not without limitations that should be
acknowledged but which also provide potential avenues
for future research. First, the statistical results obtained
in this study are relatively weak and R2 values are
quite low. As a consequence, some hypotheses are sup-
ported to a very feeble extent. As such, the implications
of the results should be taken with substantial careful-
ness. Second, the data set employed in this study is
country specific. One of the main weaknesses of a
country-specific research design is that we only observe
within-country effects, which is translated into fixed for-
mal institutions (rules of law). Future research should
therefore retest the validity of our findings using a
multi-country data set with longer survey periods.
Also, due to data limitations, we only examine two
dimensions of informal institutions, that is, collective
action norms and pro-entrepreneurship norms. Future
studies might address this issue by examining other
dimensions of informal institutions, including insti-
tutional voids (Stephan et al., 2015).
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NOTES
1. Social capital is an attribute at both individual level
and community level (Hanson & Blake, 2009; Putnam,
1993).
2. For the full list of governance forces and detailed
descriptions, see Appendix A in the supplemental data
online.
3. For more information about the sampling survey, see
Appendix F in the supplemental data online.
4. Appendix D in the supplemental data online shows
the structure of the data.
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5. Only the first two eigenvalues are > 1.
6. We also conduct an analysis on each of the nine PCI
indices. The results, presented in Appendix A3.1 in the
supplemental data online, are consistent with the two-pil-
lar framework we propose in this study.
7. Community action norms may be important for
the establishment of socialism in the North. However, we
do not expect socialism to contribute to entrepreneurship.
8. The estimation in specifications (5) and (6) is RE
instead of FE. The reason for this is that, when Hanoi
and Hochiminh are excluded, no firms move between
the two regions (north and south of Vietnam). This
makes FE inappropriate for specifications (5) and (6).
9. We do not expect the Indic decentralized patron–client
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